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INTRODUCTION 
In the last ten years, the United States has come close to experiencing 
several national public health emergencies.1  While the rest of the world 
remains afflicted with pandemics, the United States effectively manages 
many infectious diseases.2  In 2009, fear of H1N1, a novel strain of influen-
za infecting a significant portion of the population, drove U.S. federal and 
state governments to implement a massive public immunization campaign.3  
Fortunately, in the United States H1N1 cases peaked in the winter of 2009 
and appeared to dissipate afterward.4 
But what if the United States had not been so lucky?  What if the 
“plausible scenario” laid out in the report on H1N1 to President Obama, 
which estimated 1.8 million hospital admissions and as many as 90,000 
deaths, had actually occurred?5  Most public health officials agree that it is 
simply a matter of time before the United States suffers a disastrous in-
 
1  In the last ten years, the United States monitored outbreaks of novel strains of influenza around the 
world.  See H1N1 (Swine Flu), FLU.GOV, http://www.flu.gov/individualfamily/about/h1n1/index.html 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011).  On April 26, 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a 
national public health emergency declaration in response to a number of confirmed cases of H1N1 
(commonly known as “swine flu”) in the United States.  See id.  On June 11, 2009, the World Health 
Organization declared a global pandemic resulting from the spread of H1N1.  Id.  The World Health Or-
ganization also continues to monitor outbreaks of H5N1 (also known as “avian influenza”) around the 
world.  H5N1 (Bird Flu), FLU.GOV, http://www.flu.gov/individualfamily/about/h5n1/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2011).  There have been no reported cases of H5N1 in the United States, but it remains a 
serious concern because of its potential to cause a deadly pandemic.  See id.  As a countermeasure, the 
United States currently bans the importation of poultry from countries affected by H5N1.  See 9 C.F.R. 
§ 94.6(e) (2010).  In 2003, an outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Asia infected 
8098 people worldwide, and 774 of those infected died.  Fact Sheet: Basic Information About SARS, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (May 3, 2005), 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/factsheet.htm.  In the United States, only eight people were diagnosed 
with SARS, but the Centers for Disease Control continue to work with other federal agencies and state 
and local health departments to plan for the rapid recognition of person-to-person transmission of SARS.  
See id.  In addition, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, anthrax exposures, and Hurricane Katri-
na have put possible health emergencies at the forefront of government concerns.  See Sharona Hoff-
man, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1913, 1916 (2008). 
2  Robin B. McFee, Global Infections—Avian Influenza and Other Significant Emerging Pathogens: 
An Overview, 53 DISEASE-A-MONTH 343, 343 (2007). 
3  Swine Flu (H1N1 Virus), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/info/swine-flu-
h1n1-vaccine. 
4  Updated CDC Estimates of 2009 H1N1 Influenza Cases, Hospitalizations and Deaths in the Unit-
ed States, April 2009–April 10, 2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/pdf/CDC_2009_H1N1_Est_PDF_May_4_10_
fulltext.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
5  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR 2009-
H1N1 INFLUENZA, at viii (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/PCAST_
H1N1_Report.pdf. 
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fluenza epidemic.6  In such a scenario, the public will depend on physicians 
to serve the millions of patients needing medical care.7 
Private physicians, however, may hesitate to provide unconditional 
service during a public health emergency because of the legal and personal 
risks this service entails.  It is difficult to predict how physicians, the major-
ity of whom lack training for such situations, would respond amidst the 
chaos of a hospital beyond its “surge capacity.”8 
During a public health emergency, physicians face ethical situations 
uncommon in daily practice.9  If a physician decides to administer a new 
vaccine and a patient dies from an adverse reaction to that vaccine, should 
the physician be subject to civil liability?  If a physician refuses to treat a 
quarantined patient because he does not want to expose his children to a pa-
thogen, should that physician be held liable for malpractice?  The United 
States has yet to face a modern pandemic; thus, there is no direct case law 
to provide answers to these questions.  Instead, policymakers must consider 
society’s expectations of physicians, injured persons’ need for redress, and 
the government’s need to efficiently respond to public health emergencies. 
Surprisingly, despite legislatures’ recent efforts to promote emergency 
preparedness at the state and federal levels, they have not provided a clear 
answer regarding a private physician’s duties during a public health emer-
gency.  During a crisis, the government can invoke emergency laws that 
promote efficient responses to public need at both the state and federal le-
vels.  These emergency laws significantly alter the legal landscape and pro-
vide liability protection for emergency responders by giving them civil 
immunity for conduct that does not constitute willful misconduct or gross 
negligence.  Recent analyses by Professors Sharona Hoffman and James G. 
 
6  Anthony S. Fauci, Infectious Diseases: Considerations for the 21st Century, 32 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 675, 677 (2001).  The last great influenza pandemic that significantly affected the 
United States was the 1918 Spanish Influenza.  In the United States alone, over 500,000 people died and 
almost one third of all Americans were infected.  B. Kurt Copper, Comment, “High and Dry?” The 
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and Liability Protection for Pharmaceutical Manu-
facturers, J. HEALTH L., Winter 2007, at 65, 83.  The medical literature debates whether future pandem-
ics will similarly affect the population, but the 1918 Spanish Influenza illustrates the importance of 
emergency preparedness.  Id. at 84. 
7  See James G. Hodge, Jr., Lance A. Gable & Stephanie H. Cálves, The Legal Framework for Meet-
ing Surge Capacity Through the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public Health Emergen-
cies and Other Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 5, 7–8 (2005) (emphasizing the 
importance of having public health and medical systems that are prepared to increase surge capacity, 
especially during large-scale emergencies). 
8  “Surge capacity” refers to a “health care system’s ability to expand quickly beyond normal servic-
es to meet an increased demand for medical care in the event of bioterrorism or other large-scale public 
health emergencies.”  AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, PUB. NO. 06-0027, 
BIOTERRORISM AND HEALTH SYSTEM PREPAREDNESS: ADDRESSING SURGE CAPACITY IN A MASS 
CASUALTY EVENT 1 (2006), available at http://archive.ahrq.gov/news/ulp/btbriefs/btbrief9.pdf.  
9  See Gregory R. Ciottone, Introduction to Disaster Medicine, in DISASTER MEDICINE 3, 5–6 (Gre-
gory R. Ciottone et al. eds., 2006).  
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Hodge show, however, that there are significant gaps in the liability protec-
tion provided by health emergency laws, particularly for private physi-
cians.10  These gray areas of liability coverage make it necessary to analyze 
how and when traditional tort law applies during a public health emergency 
in the absence of clear statutory or regulatory suspension.11 
This Comment contributes to the analysis by offering novel common 
law-based defense theories to protect private physicians from civil liability 
during a public health emergency where legislative protection remains in-
adequate.  Part I summarizes existing emergency laws and the extent to 
which they provide liability protection for emergency responders.  Part II 
argues that private physicians should be given limited immunity during a 
public health emergency and details Professor Hoffman’s proposed legisla-
tive reform.  In the absence of legislative reform, however, judicial out-
comes will play a vital role in shaping physicians’ incentives.  Part III 
examines whether traditional tort doctrines, such as Good Samaritan im-
munity and applicable standards of care, are consistent with the proposal of 
limited physician liability during public health emergencies.  This Part con-
cludes that the foundation for physician immunity during public health 
emergencies already exists in state common law precedents.  Thus, even in 
the absence of coverage by emergency statutes, private physicians may still 
be afforded protection from civil liability.  Part IV discusses federal 
preemption and compensation funds to demonstrate the need for coordina-
tion between state and federal governments to provide comprehensive lia-
bility protection for emergency responders. 
I. THE EXISTING IMMUNITY LANDSCAPE DURING A DECLARED PUBLIC 
HEALTH EMERGENCY 
A. What Is a Public Health Emergency? 
From the outset, it is important to distinguish public health emergen-
cies from other types of emergencies or disasters.  Many definitions exist in 
the medical and public health literature, but in general public health emer-
gencies are distinguished by both their potential impact on the mortality of 
the affected population and their impact on local infrastructure.12  For ex-
ample, the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), prom-
 
10  E.g., Hodge, Gable & Cálves, supra note 7, at 10 (analyzing the uncertain legal environment that 
volunteer health professionals face during emergencies); Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1953–55 (discussing 
the exclusion of paid responders and nongovernmental entities from immunity coverage). 
11  See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage During 
Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 255 (2008) (“Legal practitioners and 
others who focus only on emergency-specific laws during actual emergencies may fail to appreciate the 
ongoing role of non-emergency laws during crises.”). 
12  See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1918–19 (defining a public health emergency pursuant to the 
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act). 
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ulgated in part by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), defines a public 
health emergency as the occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or 
health condition that:  
(1) is believed to be caused by any of the following:  
(i) bioterrorism;  
(ii) the appearance of a novel, or previously controlled or eradicated in-
fectious agent or biological toxin;  
(iii) [a natural disaster;]  
(iv) [a chemical attack or accidental release; or]  
(v) [a nuclear attack or accident]; and  
(2) poses a high probability of any of the following harms:  
(i) a large number of deaths in the affected population;  
(ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in the affected 
population; or  
(iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses a sig-
nificant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of people in 
the affected population.13 
Under this definition, the key factor in defining a public health emergency 
is its impact on the morbidity and mortality of the affected population.14  
The definition does not turn on how the health condition arises.15  Thus a 
hurricane, while not innately health related, may constitute a public health 
emergency because of its collateral effects.16  In contrast, events that occur 
on a localized scale, such as a community shooting, will likely not be a pub-
lic health emergency, even though they may be considered a terrorist attack 
against the country.17 
A public health emergency is also defined by its impact on the infra-
structure of the affected area.18  A public health emergency overwhelms the 
 
13  MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 11, § 104(m) (Ctr. for Law & the Pub.’s 
Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univs., Draft for Discussion 2001) [hereinafter MSEHPA], 
available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf. 
14  JAMES G. HODGE, JR. & LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH 
POWERS ACT—A BRIEF COMMENTARY 18 (2002), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA/Center%20MSEHPA%20Commentary.pdf. 
15  Id. 
16  See, e.g., HHS Secretary Extends Public Health Emergency for States Affected by Hurricane Ka-
trina, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Dec. 1, 2005), http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/
2005pres/20051201a.html. 
17  For example, the Fort Hood shooting in November 2009 “severely taxed local hospitals” and re-
sulted in several deaths.  Nadia Taha, Shooting Victims Flood Local Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/us/06victims.html.  Although the shooting was suspected of 
being a terrorist attack, see Richard Esposito, Matthew Cole & Brian Ross, Officials: U.S. Army Told of 
Hasan’s Contacts with al Qaeda, ABC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fort-hood-
shooter-contact-al-qaeda-terrorists-officials/story?id=9030873, the Fort Hood event was not declared a 
public health emergency. 
18  See Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1917–18. 
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local health care system and requires the community to seek outside support 
and resources.19  This aspect of a public health emergency is consistent with 
official definitions used by practitioners of disaster medicine.  The World 
Health Organization defines a disaster as “a sudden ecological phenomenon 
of sufficient magnitude to require external assistance.”20  Similarly, the 
United Nations’ International Strategy for Disaster Reduction defines a dis-
aster as “a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society 
causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses that 
exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its 
own resources.”21 
Although the medical literature attempts to define a public health 
emergency, it is generally recognized that health care providers and poli-
cymakers “know a disaster when they see one.”22  In the face of disaster 
conditions, the President, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), state governors, and sometimes local officials 
have the authority to declare a state of emergency.23  As discussed in the 
next section, an emergency declaration triggers state and federal emergency 
laws that give particular government actors special powers,24 suspend bur-
densome statutory or regulatory requirements,25 and provide some emergen-
cy responders with limited protection from civil liability.26 
B. Federal Emergency Laws and Federal Protection of Public Entities 
Most federal emergency powers are embodied in the Stafford Act.27  
This Act creates a system to provide federal aid to states affected by major 
disasters or emergencies.28  The President invokes its provisions when he 
declares a state of emergency or a major disaster.29  The Act defines a state 
 
19  See id. at 1918. 
20  David E. Hogan & Jonathan L. Burstein, Basic Perspectives on Disaster, in DISASTER MEDICINE 
1, 2 (David E. Hogan & Jonathan L. Burstein eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
21  Mark E. Keim, Environmental Disasters, in ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH: FROM GLOBAL TO 
LOCAL 843, 844 (Howard Frumkin ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
22  Hogan & Burstein, supra note 20, at 2. 
23  Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1921. 
24  E.g., Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006) (granting the HHS Secretary the 
power to make grants, enter into contracts, and investigate the cause and prevention of disease); Stafford 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121. 
25  E.g., Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, sec. 4(a), § 564(a)(1)–(2), 118 Stat. 
835, 853 (amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2006)) (allowing 
the HHS Secretary to expedite procedures for FDA approval of emergency countermeasures during a 
public health emergency). 
26  E.g., Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (providing partial 
civil immunity to entities in the chain of distribution for approved emergency countermeasures); see also 
infra notes 87–93 (providing a full discussion of the Act). 
27  See Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5202. 
28  Id. § 5121(b). 
29  Id. § 5122(1)–(2). 
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of emergency as any situation where “[f]ederal assistance is needed to sup-
plement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect 
property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a ca-
tastrophe.”30  The President can also declare a major disaster when an emer-
gency “causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant 
major disaster assistance” beyond typical emergency services.31 
On March 31, 1979, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,127, 
which consolidated federal emergency response authority under the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).32  FEMA is responsible for di-
recting and coordinating all disaster-related assistance.33  FEMA instituted 
federal emergency plans in the 1980s to create a framework and common 
language within which disaster agencies at the local, regional, and national 
level could communicate.34  FEMA also assisted in the creation of the Na-
tional Disaster Medical System (NDMS),35 which is a partnership of  “four 
federal agencies (HHS, FEMA, and the Departments of Defense and Veter-
ans Affairs), state and local governments, and the private sector.”36  NDMS 
consists of volunteer health professionals divided into teams, each of which 
focuses on a particular area of disaster relief.37  These teams can be rapidly 
deployed to areas of need during an emergency.38 
 
30  Id. § 5122(1). 
31  Id. § 5122(2).  “Emergencies” tend to be smaller events where the federal government may only 
need to play a limited role whereas “disasters” require more direct involvement by the federal govern-
ment.  For example, on August 27, 2010, President Bush declared a state of emergency in Louisiana be-
cause of Hurricane Katrina.  Emergency Aid Authorized for Hurricane Katrina Emergency Response in 
Louisiana, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Aug. 27, 2005), http://www.fema.gov/news/
newsrelease.fema?id=18447.  The emergency declaration required FEMA to supplement state and local 
emergency measures by providing equipment to meet immediate lifesaving needs and protect property.  
Id.  The emergency declaration also provided that state and local officials would be reimbursed for 75% 
of their costs of emergency measures.  Id.  As the magnitude of the effects of Hurricane Katrina became 
clearer, however, President Bush declared major disasters in several states including Florida, Mississip-
pi, Alabama, and Louisiana.  These declarations allowed FEMA to assist in debris removal, oversee 
evacuation procedures, and provide temporary housing.  For a limited time, the major disaster declara-
tion also supplied federal funding for 100% of emergency-related costs.  President Declares Major Dis-
aster for Mississippi, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.fema.gov/
news/newsrelease.fema?id=18474. 
32  Exec. Order No. 12,127, 3 C.F.R. 376 (1980); David W. Callaway, Emergency Medical Services 
in Disasters, in DISASTER MEDICINE, supra note 20, at 127, 128. 
33  See 44 C.F.R. § 206.1 (2009). 
34  See Callaway, supra note 32, at 128. 
35  Id. 
36  KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22023, ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF THE 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE DIRECTORATE: ISSUES DURING THE 109TH CONGRESS 3 
(2005), available at www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_rs22023_11jan05.pdf. 
37  National Disaster Medical System, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/responders/ndms (last visited Oct. 15, 2011); National Disaster Medi-
cal System (NDMS) Response Teams, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.phe.gov/
Preparedness/responders/ndms/teams (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (providing links to the various NDMS 
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During a public health emergency, the HHS Secretary has broad dis-
cretion to make grants, enter into contracts, and conduct investigations into 
the cause and prevention of disease.39  Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, the HHS Secretary 
has authority to activate the NDMS.40  The HHS Secretary can even waive 
or modify certain legal requirements that apply to health care providers and 
manufacturers of medical products.41  This broad authority facilitates expe-
ditious responses to emergencies. 
Despite federal statutes purporting to provide for expansive judicial re-
view and government liability, government entities (such as FEMA) and 
their employees enjoy extensive protection from civil liability that may 
arise during a public health crisis.  Under the Administrative Procedure 
Act,42 “a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adverse-
ly affected or aggrieved by agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review”43 
“except to the extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review.”44  General-
ly, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), a federal agency can be held 
liable in the same circumstances as a private person in accordance with state 
law.45  However, agency actions during a state of emergency may fall under 
the FTCA’s “discretionary function” exception, which immunizes govern-
ment actors for actions taken under duties for which they possess discre-
tion46 or analogous exceptions contained in emergency statutes.  For 
example, like the FTCA, the Stafford Act explicitly limits the United 
States’ liability by providing that “[t]he Federal Government shall not be li-
able for any claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.”47  The analysis of 
whether an agency’s actions are discretionary and therefore excepted from 
 
team services, including general medical services, international surgical assistance, veterinarian support, 
and victim identification expertise). 
38  BEA, supra note 36, at 3. 
39  Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006). 
40  42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11. 
41  For example, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act requires a hospital to evaluate all 
individuals who come to the hospital’s emergency department.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).  The HHS 
Secretary may also temporarily waive this requirement during a public health emergency.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320b-5(b)(3). 
42  5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
43  Id. § 702. 
44  Id. § 701(a). 
45  28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2672 (2006). 
46  See id. § 2680(a) (excusing agencies and their employees from civil liability for “[a]ny claim 
based upon . . . the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function 
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government”); see also United States v. 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–24 (1991) (describing cases in which the FTCA’s “discretionary function” 
exception operated to excuse government agents’ negligence because the government entrusted them 
with judgment in specific capacities). 
47  42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006). 
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liability under the Stafford Act is synonymous with that under the FTCA.48  
When confronting the question of whether the agency’s actions during an 
emergency situation were discretionary in nature, courts are typically reluc-
tant to hold U.S. agencies and employees liable.49  Courts recognize the 
need to allow the government latitude when implementing measures to re-
lieve human suffering and economic damage in a disaster situation.50 
At the individual level, government emergency responders are pro-
tected by qualified civil immunity.  This doctrine protects “government of-
ficials performing discretionary functions” when “their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known.”51  Thus, as long as the emergency res-
ponder’s actions in a public health crisis fall within a reasonable range, 
liability will not attach.  Qualified immunity extends not only to public 
health officials but also to private individuals deputized by the HHS Secre-
tary to assist in emergency response efforts.52  For example, people per-
forming medical, surgical, or related functions for the NDMS, even on an 
intermittent basis, are classified as “federal employees” and are thus entitled 
to qualified immunity.53 
C. Federal Protection for Private Entities Responding to Public Health 
Disasters 
Federal emergency laws provide protection not only for public entities 
but also for some purely private entities including drug manufacturers.  
 
48  See Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home Park, L.C. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 392, 397–98 (1998) (de-
scribing the FTCA’s and the Stafford Act’s “discretionary function” exceptions as “analogous and simi-
larly stated”); Dureiko v. Phillips & Jordon Inc., No. 95-1441, 1996 WL 825402, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 
29, 1996) (describing the two exceptions as “virtually identical”). 
49  See, e.g., Sunrise Vill., 42 Fed. Cl. at 397–400 (noting that the legislative history of the Stafford 
Act makes clear the public policy purpose of the “discretionary” exception); see also 96 CONG. REC. 
11,912 (1950) (statement of Rep. William M. Whittington) (“[I]f the agencies of the Government make 
a mistake in the administration of the [Stafford] Act . . . the Government may not be sued.”). 
50  See, e.g., Sunrise Vill., 42 Fed. Cl. at 397–98 (noting that Congress designed special measures to 
assist states affected by emergencies “because disasters often cause loss of life, human suffering, loss of 
income, and property loss and damage; and . . . because disasters often disrupt the normal functioning of 
governments and communities, and adversely affect individuals and families with great severity” (omis-
sion in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5121(a))). 
51  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
52  See Abigail Williams, Liability Issues in Emergency Response, in DISASTER MEDICINE, supra 
note 9, at 71, 76–77; see also Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 556–59 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a 
private foster care contractor and its private social workers could assert qualified immunity because of 
their close association with and supervision by governmental agencies).  See generally 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300hh-11(c) (giving authority to the HHS secretary to deputize individuals assisting in the develop-
ment of emergency countermeasures as Federal Public Health Service employees). 
53  See 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11(c)(2) (stating that, with respect to liability, the individuals appointed 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11(d)(1) as part of the NDMS are employees of the Public Health Ser-
vice); Williams, supra note 52, at 77 (describing the application of qualified immunity statutes to gov-
ernment responders during disasters). 
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Federal immunity provisions for manufacturers emerged in the beginning of 
the 1960s as the result of conflicts between state tort law and national pub-
lic health policies.  Since then, Congress has passed numerous federal sta-
tutes providing broad liability protection for medical product manufactur-
ers. 
1. The Historical Tension Between Tort Law and Public Health Poli-
cies.—For much of recent history, the goals of tort law and government 
public health policy have coexisted in an uneasy tension.  In particular, the 
rise of strict liability during the 1960s threatened the government’s ability 
to respond to public health threats.  As a result, in the last fifty years, the 
federal government has passed several pieces of legislation to respond to 
state-imposed liability on manufacturers of emergency countermeasures. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the federal government attempted to era-
dicate polio through mass administration of polio vaccines.54  One of the 
types of the polio vaccine contained live polio virus, which made the vac-
cine more effective but may also have caused several people to contract po-
lio.55 
Before the 1960s, the “learned intermediary”56 doctrine provided an 
almost absolute defense in personal injury suits for vaccine manufacturers.57  
Under this doctrine, a manufacturer does not need to warn the patient of the 
risks associated with the product so long as they warn the patient’s prescrib-
ing physician.58  The theory behind the learned intermediary doctrine is that 
the physician is not a “mere conduit of the product” but instead “exercise[s] 
‘independent discretion and judgment’ in weighing the benefits of the man-
ufacturer’s product” for the patient.59  Other justifications for the doctrine 
include the impracticability of communication between the manufacturer 
and the patient and the reluctance to interfere with the traditional doctor–
patient relationship.60 
In the groundbreaking 1968 case Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit held the learned intermediary doctrine inapplicable when a 
 
54  See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1269–70 (5th Cir. 1974) (attributing the precipitous 
drop in cases of polio to, among other things, a massive federal immunization program). 
55  Id. at 1273–74. 
56  The term “learned intermediary” was first used in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 
(8th Cir. 1966).  James Ottavio Castagnera & Richard Ryan Gerner, The Gradual Enfeeblement of the 
Learned Intermediary Rule and the Argument in Favor of Abandoning It Entirely, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 
119, 120 n.4 (2000). 
57  Castagnera & Gerner, supra note 56, at 122. 
58  Kathy A. King-Cameron, Comment, Carving Another Exception to the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine: Application of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 
68 TUL. L. REV. 937, 942–43 (1994). 
59  Id. at 943 (quoting Paul D. Rheingold, Products Liability—The Ethical Drug Manufacturer’s 
Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 986 (1964)). 
60  See id. at 944–45. 
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vaccine was distributed freely through clinics and not through prescrip-
tion.61  The court looked to section 402A of the Second Restatement of 
Torts62 and the accompanying comment k.63  Comment k encompasses un-
avoidably unsafe products, providing that strict liability shall not be applied 
to such products so long as they were properly prepared and marketed.64  
The Davis court found that the manufacturer’s failure to warn consumers of 
the risks of the polio vaccine made the vaccine “unreasonably dangerous.”65  
Thus, the court held the manufacturer strictly liable for injuries resulting 
from the vaccine.66  Six years later, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the Ninth 
Circuit’s Davis ruling in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories.67 
 
61  399 F.2d 121, 130–31 (9th Cir. 1968). 
62  The Restatement provides: 
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate 
user or consumer, or to his property, if  
 (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and  
 (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the con-
dition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although  
 (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and  
 (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual rela-
tion with the seller. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
63  Comment k to § 402A provides: 
Unavoidably Unsafe Products.  There are some products which, in the present state of human 
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.  These are 
especially common in the field of drugs.  An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur 
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences 
when it is injected.  Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing 
and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk 
which they involve.  Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and 
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.  The same is true of many other drugs, 
vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physi-
cians, or under the prescription of a physician.  It is also true in particular of many new or experi-
mental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical 
experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such 
experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically re-
cognizable risk.  The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly 
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be 
held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has un-
dertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a 
known but apparently reasonable risk. 
Id. at cmt. k. 
64  Id. 
65  Davis, 399 F.2d at 128–30. 
66  Id. at 130. 
67  498 F.2d 1264, 1272–76 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that although the vaccine—the same one at issue 
in Davis—was not “unreasonably dangerous per se” because the benefits of the vaccine outweighed the 
potential harm, the vaccine was unreasonably dangerous as marketed because it failed to adequately 
warn vaccine patients of the possibility of contracting polio). 
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Reyes and Davis opened the floodgates for suits against vaccine manu-
facturers.  Numerous plaintiffs successfully litigated against pharmaceutical 
companies for vaccine-related injuries.68  Between 1980 and 1984, plaintiffs 
sought $3.5 billion in damages from vaccine manufacturers.69  Many manu-
facturers fled the market, and those who continued manufacturing vaccines 
significantly increased prices and thus passed on the costs of litigation to 
consumers.70  The resulting “public health disaster” spurred Congress to 
pass legislation addressing the liability crisis in the vaccine industry.71 
2. Federal Statutory Protections for Manufacturers of Covered 
Countermeasures.—Beginning in the 1970s, Congress enacted several sta-
tutes to protect manufacturers from the imposition of liability by state 
courts.  In 1976, New Jersey experienced an outbreak of a novel strain of 
influenza at Fort Dix.72  The government feared a large-scale pandemic and 
began working on a mass immunization program against the Fort Dix flu 
(later dubbed the “swine flu”).73  The program stalled, however, when 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and their insurers became reluctant to partic-
ipate in the program due to the burden of liability for vaccine-related inju-
ries.74 
In response to growing public panic over a possible influenza pandem-
ic, Congress passed the National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 
1976,75 which provided an exclusive remedy against the government for in-
juries resulting from the vaccine.76  In 1977, Professor Marshall Shapo ana-
 
68  See Robert M. McKenna, Comment, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the Development of 
a Vaccine Against the AIDS Virus, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 954–55 (1988).  
69  Erik Volker Ernst Eisele, Comment, A Dose of Reality: Revisiting Pharmaceutical Manufacturer 
Liability for an HIV Vaccine, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 703, 712–13 (2008). 
70  Id. at 713. 
71  Id. (describing the enactment of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, “a national 
no-fault compensation scheme for victims of certain vaccine-related injuries”). 
72  Marshall S. Shapo, Swine Flu and Legal Policy, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1977, at 51, 51. 
73  Id.  The nickname “swine flu” arose from scientific evidence that the Fort Dix flu was similar to 
strains of influenza that circulate in pigs.  Taia T. Wang & Peter Palese, Unraveling the Mystery of 
Swine Influenza Virus, 137 CELL 983, 983 (2009). 
74  Shapo, supra note 72, at 51–52 (“[T]here arose some political issues that threatened the program.  
These stemmed from the fears of vaccine manufacturers concerning their potential exposure to liability 
for personal injuries that might occur to those who subjected themselves to immunization.”); see also 
Marc A. Franklin & Joseph E. Mais, Jr., Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from the 
Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 754, 769 (1977) (“The imposition of liability in Reyes and in 
other polio cases and the uncertainty surrounding the basis for liability in these cases made insurance 
companies reluctant to underwrite a national flu immunization program.” (footnote omitted)). 
75  Pub. L. No. 94-380, § 2, 90 Stat. 1113 (amending Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247b) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006)). 
76  See id. at 1115 (“The United States shall be liable with respect to claims submitted after Septem-
ber 30, 1976 for personal injury or death arising out of the administration of swine flu vaccine under the 
swine flu program and based upon the act or omission of a program participant . . . .”); In re Swine Flu 
Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 695, 699 (D.D.C. 1981) (“Under the Act, the United States 
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lyzed the government’s novel approach to the Fort Dix flu, including its de-
cision to compensate patients for physical harms resulting from the vaccine 
program and its assumption of a general duty to protect the public from a 
pandemic.77  Although these decisions were controversial in the 1970s, the 
federal government continues to adhere to the policy underlying these deci-
sions in promulgating other public health emergency statutes and programs.  
The National Swine Flu Immunization Program became the foundation for 
future government compensation funds covering injuries resulting from na-
tional public health measures. 
In 1986, Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act 
(NCVIA).78  The liability protection for manufacturers under NCVIA is not 
as comprehensive as that under the National Swine Flu Immunization Pro-
gram.  Nonetheless, NCVIA requires that individuals adjudicate claims over 
$1000 through the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program before filing a 
civil claim.79  The NCVIA creates a federal no-fault system for compensat-
ing vaccine-related injuries and deaths through a procedure involving the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims and its special masters.80  After NCVIA’s pas-
sage, the national vaccine stockpile stabilized; nonetheless, manufacturers 
continue to avoid the market because of the low profit margin in vaccines.81 
After the events of September 11, 2001, public health became an issue 
of national security.  Congress thus passed the Project BioShield Act of 
2004 to facilitate the development of countermeasures against possible ter-
rorist attacks.82  The Act streamlined the research and FDA approval of 
drugs, devices, and other products deemed to be priorities during public 
health emergencies.83  For example, the HHS Secretary may expedite the 
peer review process for scientific research.84  She also has the authority to 
 
accepted primary responsibility for injuries caused by the manufacture, distribution, or administration of 
this swine flu vaccine.”). 
77  See Shapo, supra note 72, at 53–54. 
78  Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 311(a), 100 Stat. 3755, 3756 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-
34). 
79  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A)–(3). 
80  See id. § 300aa-12; see also McDonald v. Lederle Labs., 775 A.2d 528, 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2001) (“[T]he Act bars an individual, who files an untimely petition, from later seeking recovery 
for injuries resulting from an adverse reaction to vaccination in a subsequently filed State civil action.”). 
81  Copper, supra note 6, at 74–75. 
82  See Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (amending 
the Public Health Service Act to provide protections and countermeasures against chemical, radiologi-
cal, or nuclear agents that may be used in a terrorist attack against the United States). 
83  42 U.S.C. § 247d-6a(a)–(c). 
84  Id. § 247d-6a(c)(1) (“The Secretary may, as the Secretary determines necessary to respond to 
pressing qualified countermeasure research and development needs under this section, employ such ex-
pedited peer review procedures (including consultation with appropriate scientific experts) as the Secre-
tary, in consultation with the Director of [the National Institutes of Health], deems appropriate to obtain 
assessment of scientific and technical merit and likely contribution to the field of qualified countermea-
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approve a product for emergency use even if it has not been previously ap-
proved for commercial distribution or for the particular use that she is pro-
moting.85  In addition, individuals developing countermeasures under a 
government contract are considered federal employees of the HHS and are 
therefore entitled to qualified immunity from tort suits stemming from their 
work.86 
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREPA)87 is 
the most sweeping emergency law passed after September 11, 2001.  It en-
courages the development of vaccines and other countermeasures to address 
potential public health emergencies.88  PREPA gives almost unlimited au-
thority to the HHS Secretary to declare a medical product a “covered coun-
termeasure.”89  Once a product is declared a “covered countermeasure,” 
“covered person[s]” along the chain of distribution have limited immunity 
under federal and state law “with respect to all claims for loss caused by, 
arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use 
by an individual of a covered countermeasure.”90  A “covered person” under 
the statute may be a person or an entity that manufactures or distributes the 
countermeasure.91  Someone qualified to administer or prescribe the coun-
termeasure may also be covered.92  The statute, however, does not grant 
immunity from liability for an injury caused by the willful misconduct of 
covered persons.93 
Individuals injured by a product approved for emergency use under 
PREPA can recover from the Covered Countermeasure Process Fund.94  
 
sure research, in place of the peer review and advisory council review procedures that would [otherwise] 
be required . . . .”). 
85  21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
86  42 U.S.C. § 247d-6a(d)(2)(A) (“A person carrying out a contract under paragraph (1), and an of-
ficer, employee, or governing board member of such person, shall, subject to a determination by the Sec-
retary, be deemed to be an employee of the Department of Health and Human Services for purposes of 
claims under sections 1346(b) and 2672 of title 28 for money damages for personal injury, including 
death, resulting from performance of functions under such contract.”). 
87  Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2818 (2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d to  
-6e). 
88  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d to -6e; Copper, supra note 6, at 66–67 (“PREPA represents another at-
tempt by Congress to respond to the widespread concerns of disease outbreak in this era of bioterrorism 
by shielding pharmaceutical manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by countermeasures em-
ployed to combat a public health emergency.”). 
89  See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(1).  A covered countermeasure is defined as one of the following: a 
“qualified pandemic or epidemic product”; a “security countermeasure”; or “a drug . . . , biological 
product . . . , or device . . . that is authorized for emergency use in accordance with . . . the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act.  Id. § 247d-6d(i)(1)(C). 
90  Id. § 247d-6d(a)(1). 
91  Id. § 247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). 
92  Id. § 247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(iv).  The statute also provides liability protection for agents and employees 
of covered persons.  Id. § 247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(v). 
93  Id. § 247d-6d(d)(1). 
94  Id. § 247d-6e. 
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The fund provides compensation for individuals whose injuries are “caused 
by the administration or use of a covered countermeasure pursuant to [a] 
declaration” by the HHS Secretary.95  The HHS Secretary has broad discre-
tion to determine who can receive compensation and the time period during 
which the injury must manifest.96  The fund provides compensation for 
medical benefits, lost employment income, and death benefits,97 but it does 
not provide damages for pain and suffering.98 
3. Summary of Federal Liability Protection During Public Health 
Emergencies.—Federal law provides liability protection for three groups: 
(1) government entities and employees; (2) private individuals deputized by 
the HHS Secretary, pursuant to statutory authority, as federal employees; 
and (3) private manufacturers and distributors of emergency countermea-
sures.99  These groups are generally protected from liability for acts that do 
not amount to willful misconduct, gross negligence, or criminal conduct.100 
In contrast, private sector physicians, regardless of their vital role in 
public health and safety, are often ineligible for liability protection under 
federal emergency laws.101  The closest federal emergency laws come to 
providing protection for private health care workers is the immunity provi-
sion of PREPA.102  However, immunity under PREPA requires that the in-
jury result from the use of medical products specifically approved as 
covered countermeasures.103  Thus, when private health care workers use 
something other than a covered countermeasure, they receive no explicit 
protection from civil liability under federal law. 
D. State Emergency Laws 
Historically, most state statutes did not mandate emergency prepared-
ness specifically for public health emergencies.104  Public health policies 
evolved independently within states, which made it difficult to coordinate 
responses to multijurisdictional public health issues.105  In the wake of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax attacks, the CDC pushed for 
the development of a comprehensive plan for responding to a public health 
emergency.106  The Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown 
 
95  Id. § 247d-6e(b)(1). 
96  See id. § 247d-6e(b)(4)–(5). 
97  Id. §§ 239c–239e, 247d-6e(b)(2). 
98  See id. §§ 239c–239e, 247d-6e(b)(2). 
99  See Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1950–54. 
100  See id. 
101  Id. at 1953–54. 
102  See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text. 
103  See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
104  See HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
105  Id. 
106  MSEHPA, supra note 13, at 6. 
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and Johns Hopkins Universities, in coordination with the CDC, drafted 
MSEHPA to help state legislatures develop public health emergency 
laws.107  By 2010, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia had 
created statutes modeled after provisions in MSEHPA.108 
The immunity provisions in MSEHPA reflect the extent of liability 
protection provided in federal emergency laws.  The MSEHPA liability sec-
tion provides immunity for the good faith acts of state officials as long as 
the acts do not constitute gross negligence or willful misconduct.109  
MSEHPA also provides liability protection for entities contracting with the 
state under provisions of MSEHPA and for those who render assistance at 
the request of the state.110  These provisions, however, are worded more 
broadly than federal laws granting the HHS Secretary authority to designate 
individuals as federal employees.  For example, to be deputized as a federal 
employee under the NDMS system an individual must be officially ap-
pointed by the HHS Secretary.111  In contrast, liability protection under 
MSEHPA requires only a showing that the individual was either directed by 
the state or that the state requested the individual’s advice or assistance.112  
No official appointment is necessary. 
A limited number of states provide broader liability protection than 
MSEHPA.  In Maine, for example, private institutions and individuals re-
ceive the same immunity protection that state agencies and employees re-
ceive during “extreme public health emergenc[ies].”113  In Louisiana during 
a public health emergency, any health care provider is immune from liabili-
ty for causing injury as long as his actions do not constitute willful miscon-
duct or gross negligence.114 
Some states maintain laws that only address general emergencies.115  
These general emergency laws also provide certain liability protections, 
which range from broad immunity shielding public and private actors alike 
to limited immunity protecting only public health providers.116 
 
107  Id. at 1 n.1, 6. 
108  The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), CTRS. FOR LAW & PUB.’S HEALTH, 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/ModelLaws/MSEHPA.php (last modified Jan. 27, 2010); see, e.g., Lou-
isiana Health Emergency Powers Act, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 29:760–:772 (2007). 
109  MSEHPA, supra note 13, at 37, § 804(a). 
110  Id. at 37–38, § 804(b). 
111  42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11(c) (2006). 
112  See MSEHPA, supra note 13, at 37–38, § 804(b). 
113  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 816(1) (2010). 
114  Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act, LA. REV. STAT. § 29:771(B)(2)(c) (2007). 
115  Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1949–50 (listing California, Michigan, and Minnesota as states with 
general emergency statutes). 
116  See, e.g., California Emergency Services Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8655, 8657, 8659 (West 
2005 & Supp. 2011) (providing liability protection for state employees, volunteers, and private health 
care workers who render services during an emergency); Emergency Management Act, MICH. COMP. 
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Existing state and federal emergency laws create a nebulous scheme of 
liability protection for private emergency responders.  For example, a phy-
sician treating a patient during a Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) outbreak could be sued for malpractice under state common law.  
But if the virus spreads to other states, the HHS Secretary could respond by 
declaring a federal public health emergency and thus triggering liability 
protection for certain emergency responders.  The physician could then at-
tempt to argue that he is covered by federal immunity provisions.  Courts, 
however, have not yet addressed whether immunity provisions in federal 
emergency laws would preempt or otherwise affect state common law 
claims.117  Thus, due to the confusing layers of state and federal emergency 
laws, private emergency responders have no certainty about their legal lia-
bilities during public health emergencies.118 
II. EXPANDING LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PHYSICIANS 
DURING PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
The structure of the U.S. health care system makes private physicians 
the first group to respond to a public health emergency.119  Physicians who 
are not deputized by the government but nonetheless respond to public 
health emergencies serve the public’s interests often at great risk to them-
selves.  Thus, private physicians should be afforded the same liability pro-
tection as public health care workers during public health emergencies. 
A. Facilitating Physician Response: Encouragement over Coercion 
A public health emergency strains already limited health care re-
sources.120  In the event of an influenza pandemic, the HHS estimates that 
hospitalization would increase three to seven times and that there would be 
a fourfold increase in outpatient visits compared to a normal flu year.121  In 
addition, hospitals and physicians may need to establish quarantines to iso-
late infected individuals from the rest of the patient population.122  In sum, a 
public health emergency places extreme pressure on both financial and hu-
man resources.  To meet the surge in demand for medical services during a 
 
LAWS ANN. § 30.411 (West Supp. 2011) (providing disaster responders other than state employees with 
the same immunity as state employees). 
117  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
118  See HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
119  See Hogan & Burstein, supra note 20. 
120  Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionals to Work Dur-
ing an Influenza Pandemic, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (2008). 
121  Vickie J. Williams, Fluconomics: Preserving Our Hospital Infrastructure During and After a 
Pandemic, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 99, 109 (2007). 
122  See Coleman, supra note 120, at 8 (“Hospitals will also need to find space to treat infected pa-
tients and, possibly, to quarantine individuals who are not sick but who may have been exposed to the 
virus.”). 
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public health emergency, it is imperative to mobilize as many health care 
workers and facilities as possible. 
Recent examples of health care provider behavior during health emer-
gencies, however, have led experts to question whether private physicians 
will adequately respond to public need in an emergency.123  The outbreak of 
SARS in 2002 had a disproportionate impact on health care workers and in-
frastructure.124  In Hong Kong, physicians and nurses accounted for 22% of 
the SARS deaths.125  In Taiwan, more than 90% of SARS infections oc-
curred in hospitals, and 160 health care workers chose to resign rather than 
work with SARS patients.126  Private health care employees were reluctant 
to treat SARS patients due to the risk of exposure to the virus, the disrup-
tion to their lives resulting from such an exposure, and the accompanying 
social ostracism.127 
Physicians and nurses in the United States are unlikely to respond dif-
ferently than their foreign counterparts.128  One of the most telling examples 
of physician reluctance occurred when the AIDS pandemic came to the fo-
refront of national concern in the 1980s.  Some doctors turned away AIDS 
patients after studies revealed that the virus could be transferred through 
bodily fluids.129  In its first statement on the AIDS issue, the American Med-
ical Association (AMA) condoned the right to refuse treatment, advising 
physicians to care for HIV-positive patients only if they were “emotionally 
able” to do so.130  Although the AMA reversed its policy on AIDS after sub-
stantial criticism,131 its original statement demonstrates that the medical pro-
 
123  See, e.g., Williams, supra note 121, at 101 (“The broad impact that such a pandemic would have 
raises a litany of questions: How will the nation’s hospitals [fare] when faced with the financial demands 
imposed during and after a pandemic?  Even if they can withstand the immediate fiscal impact of the 
pandemic, will they ultimately survive the ordeal?  Will they act in the best interests of the public’s 
health, even if it causes them potentially fatal economic injury?”). 
124  See Mark A. Rothstein, Are Traditional Public Health Strategies Consistent with Contemporary 
American Values?, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 175, 185–86 (2004). 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
127  Id. at 186. 
128  Id. (“The refusal to care for infected patients might be even more widespread in the United 
States than in Asia and Canada. . . .  The issue of health care providers refusing to treat infected patients, 
however, is more complicated than merely the fears and prejudices of some health care providers.  There 
has been a major loss of community in healthcare.  Through managed care and other measures, the phy-
sician-patient relationship has eroded.”). 
129  Williams, supra note 121, at 16. 
130  See Coleman, supra note 120, at 11. 
131  Id. at 11–12 (“Following extensive criticism, the AMA quickly reversed course and declared that 
‘[a] physician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose condition is within the physician’s cur-
rent realm of competence solely because the patient is seropositive for HIV.’” (footnote omitted) (quot-
ing COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: 
CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS § 9.131 (2008))). 
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fession is as susceptible as the rest of the public is to the fears and anxieties 
that accompany a health crisis.132 
The AMA’s initial response to HIV follows a historical change in pro-
fessional expectations for physicians.  The AMA’s first Code of Ethics 
(promulgated in 1847) stated that “[w]hen pestilence prevails, it is [physi-
cians’] duty to face the danger, and to continue their labors for the allevia-
tion of suffering, even at the jeopardy of their own lives.”133  Over time, 
however, the AMA tempered the language of this provision, and in 1977 it 
removed the provision altogether.134 
U.S. history and recent events abroad demonstrate that society cannot 
depend solely on physician altruism to provide adequate medical resources 
in a public health emergency.  Policymakers should therefore concentrate 
on removing disincentives to physician participation in emergency response 
plans and ensuring that physicians who do participate are not punished for 
their altruism. 
By excluding private physicians from liability protection, current 
emergency laws take for granted physicians’ humanitarian values and as-
sume that all physicians are accustomed to facing emergency situations or 
high risks of infection.  An oncologist, rheumatologist, or family practition-
er, however, likely does not face such risks in her normal practice.  Thus, 
the burdens placed on physicians during a public health emergency can, as 
one commentator put it, “exceed the ethical commitments individuals make 
when they accept a professional license.”135  It would therefore be a mistake 
to penalize physicians by making them civilly liable for the difficult moral 
and professional choices they must make during public health emergen-
cies.136 
Policymakers should concentrate on removing disincentives like civil 
liability to encourage private physician participation in public health emer-
gencies.  A substantial literature documents the effects of liability on the 
market for medical care.  Malpractice premium costs are a significant factor 
 
132  See, e.g., Leslie A. Nickell et al., Psychosocial Effects of SARS on Hospital Staff: Survey of a 
Large Tertiary Care Institution, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 793, 796–97 (2004) (finding that SARS had 
significant psychosocial effects on hospital staff and their families and negatively impacted their life-
styles).  
133  Coleman, supra note 120, at 10 (second alteration in original) (quoting Samuel J. Huber & Mat-
thew K. Wynia, When Pestilence Prevails . . . Physician Responsibilities in Epidemics, AM. J. BIO-
ETHICS, Winter 2004, at W5, W6) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134  Id. at 10–11. 
135  Id. at 3. 
136  See Kenneth Kipnis, Overwhelming Casualties: Medical Ethics in a Time of Terror, 
10 ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 57, 61 (2003) (“Mass casualties and professionalism force a transformation 
of everyday moral intuitions.  Two errors are common in implementing disaster triage, both traceable to 
understandable and ordinarily praiseworthy character traits: the virtue of compassion, and persever-
ance.”). 
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in medical students’ choice of specialty.137  Insurance premiums and caps on 
damage awards also affect where recently graduated physicians choose to 
locate their practices.138  Even after establishing their practices, physicians 
may decide to discontinue high-risk procedures, turn away high-risk pa-
tients, close practices, or move out of state to avoid potential litigation 
costs.139  Thus, from the day they graduate from medical school, physicians 
are highly aware of their liability exposure when making practice-related 
decisions. 
Some commentators argue that physicians do not need liability protec-
tion to incentivize emergency care response.140  Yet federal and state gov-
ernments support liability protection for other groups of emergency 
responders like public employees and volunteers, including those participat-
ing in the NDMS system.141  Courts have also recognized the need to pro-
vide Good Samaritan immunity to physicians assisting at the scene of an 
accident.142  Moreover, to construe the argument for physician immunity as 
implying that physicians are reluctant to cooperate with public officials is 
an oversimplification.  Physician response to a public health emergency is 
not simply a question of whether a physician will show up for work but of 
how aggressively the physician will treat his patients and how engaged he 
will be in emergency response plans.  For example, physicians may be more 
willing to put in longer hours, despite exhaustion, if they do not have to be 
concerned about malpractice liability stemming from their treatments.  Si-
milarly, physicians may be more willing to administer risky but effective 
emergency countermeasures if they know that they will not be held liable 
for resulting injuries.  By providing liability protection, policymakers help 
alleviate concerns that physicians may have when participating in emergen-
cy response plans and thus encourage a more aggressive approach to the 
public health emergency. 
 
137  See B.F. Kiker & Michael Zeh, Relative Income Expectations, Expected Malpractice Premium 
Costs, and Other Determinants of Physician Specialty Choice, 39 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 152, 163 
(1998). 
138  Chiu-Fang Chou & Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Practice Location Choice by New Physicians: The 
Importance of Malpractice Premiums, Damage Caps, and Health Professional Shortage Area Designa-
tion, 44 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1271, 1272 (2009). 
139  See GOVERNOR’S SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE PROF’L LIAB. INS., at iii (2003), 
www.doh.state.fl.us/myflorida/DOH-Large-Final Book.pdf (describing malpractice premium effects in 
Florida); Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The New Medical Malpractice 
Crisis, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2281, 2281 (2003) (describing the recent malpractice crisis in which phy-
sicians were unable to obtain malpractice coverage, causing hospitals to temporarily close or threaten to 
close emergency rooms, obstetric, and other high-risk services). 
140  See, e.g., George J. Annas, Standard of Care—In Sickness and in Health and in Emergencies, 
362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2126, 2126 (2010) (pointing out that physicians did not need liability protection 
as an inducement to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks). 
141  For a discussion of protections for these types of responders, see supra notes 52–53 and accom-
panying text. 
142  See infra Part III.B.  
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B. Distinguishing Public Health Emergencies from Typical Emergency 
Medicine 
Even emergency-trained physicians should be afforded liability protec-
tion because public health crises present unique situations.  Public health 
emergencies involve different considerations and often require actions that 
fall outside the normal duties of the physician.143  One might argue that 
emergency room physicians should not receive liability protection because 
they regularly face emergency situations where they must make difficult 
decisions: local hospitals are often inundated with patients as a result of car 
crashes and other crises.  In particular, emergency medicine physicians are 
uniquely equipped with the foundational knowledge and skill set required to 
cope with a public health emergency.144  They regularly risk exposure and 
are accustomed to a broad and unpredictable practice environment.145 
By definition, however, the scale of the emergency distinguishes a 
public health emergency.146  At any time, an emergency room may expe-
rience a surge as a result of local disasters and may handle the situation 
without any decline in care, a demonstration of its surge capacity.147  How-
ever, there comes a point at which the surge stresses the health care system 
and makes it impossible to adequately maintain the normal standard of 
care.148  Then the emergency is no longer a part of the routine flux but be-
comes a public health emergency. 
During a public health emergency, physicians must look beyond spe-
cific patients’ needs and consider how decisions will affect the safety of the 
public at large.149  As a result, physicians may need to adjust their standards 
of care for the greater good.  The surge in demand for medical care and li-
mited resources during a public health emergency dramatically change tri-
age procedures.150  For instance, disaster triage requires physicians to 
 
143  Ciottone, supra note 9, at 5 (“There are no practitioners who leave home in the morning intent 
on seeing disaster patients. . . .  [T]he disaster falls on an unsuspecting emergency responder who is 
forced to abandon his or her normal duties and adopt a role in the overall disaster response.”). 
144  Hogan & Burstein, supra note 20, at 3. 
145  See id. at 2–3. 
146  See discussion supra Part I.A. 
147  See Transcript of Web Conference, Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, Surge Capacity 
and Health System Preparedness: Addressing Surge Capacity in a Mass Casualty Event (Oct. 26, 2004), 
http://archive.ahrq.gov/news/ulp/btsurgemass/masscastr.htm [hereinafter Surge Capacity Conference]; 
see also supra note 8. 
148  David E. Hogan & Julio Rafael Lairet, Triage, in DISASTER MEDICINE, supra note 20, at 12, 13 
(distinguishing “mass casualty incident” triage, during which “the local emergency care system becomes 
more stressed but is not overwhelmed,” from “disaster triage,” during which “the local resources are un-
able to provide immediate care on a timely basis” to all patients); Surge Capacity Conference, supra 
note 147. 
149  Hogan & Lairet, supra note 148, at 13; see also infra Part III.A. 
150  The process of determining a patient’s priority for treatment is known as “triage.”  Physicians 
serving in World War I introduced the triage system to the United States.  See Matthew D. Sztajnkrycer, 
Bo E. Madsen & Amado Alejandro Báez, Unstable Ethical Plateaus and Disaster Triage, 
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prioritize patients based on predicted survivability.151  This triage may re-
quire diverting resources from critically ill or injured patients, whose treat-
ment would be resource intensive, to patients for whom limited resources 
can do the greatest amount of good.152  In contrast, ordinary triage procedure 
in an emergency room prioritizes care to severely injured individuals and 
seeks to provide optimal care to all patients.153  Thus, during a public health 
emergency, physicians encounter unique ethical and medical situations not 
seen in typical emergency situations or in the regular practice of other areas 
of medicine.154 
Ultimately, whether an event constitutes a public health emergency 
may be a policy determination made by elected or appointed government 
officials.  The executive branch of either the state or federal government 
must decide if large-scale coordination is necessary to address the emergen-
cy and, if so, declare a public health emergency.  Unlike a car crash or other 
common emergency, a public health emergency requires public and private 
health care workers to coordinate to provide medical care and institute pre-
vention plans.  It is therefore the role of policymakers, typically through the 
executive branch, to decide if a disaster rises to the level of a public health 
emergency and necessitates coordinated, immediate action that may not be 
appropriate in an everyday emergency.  When officials determine that the 
emergency rises to this level, physician immunity should play an essential 
role in ensuring full participation and assistance from the medical commu-
nity. 
C. Professor Hoffman’s Proposal for Legislative Reform 
Professor Hoffman proposes that federal and state legislatures create a 
comprehensive immunity provision addressing liability for all health care 
workers, public and private.155  The comprehensive provision would be in-
corporated in the Public Health Service Act and state public health emer-
gency laws.156  Mirroring the current extent of federal liability protection, 
 
24 EMERGENCY MED. CLINICS N. AM. 749, 752 (2006).  Triage is based on the utilitarian theory that, in 
order for medical care to be truly lifesaving when resources are limited, it must be provided to those 
most in need.  Id.  Thus, a physician can withhold care when either it is futile or it is possible to delay 
care until a later time.  Id. 
151  See Ciottone, supra note 9, at 5. 
152  Id. at 5–6. 
153  Hogan & Lairet, supra note 148, at 13.  Triage is performed daily and routinely in an emergency 
room.  The overall goal of daily triage is “to identify the sickest patients to supply early evaluation and 
treatment. . . .  [T]he highest intensity of care is provided to the most seriously ill patients, even if those 
patients have a low probability of survival.  In this [normal emergency room] setting, optimal care is 
provided to all presenting patients.”  Id.  In disaster triage, physicians’ priorities shift from providing 
optimal care to the sickest patients to “doing the greatest good for the greatest number.”  Id. 
154  See Ciottone, supra note 9, at 5. 
155  Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1959. 
156  Id. 
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the legislation would immunize health care providers responding to de-
clared public health emergencies as long as the physicians did not engage in 
willful misconduct, gross negligence, or criminal activity.157  As with other 
emergency provisions, a declaration of a public health emergency would 
trigger the immunity provision.158  When the state or federal executive 
branch decided that the extraordinary mobilization of resources to respond 
to the effects of a public health emergency was no longer required, liability 
protection would no longer be needed and would be terminated.159  Profes-
sor Hoffman argues that comprehensive limited immunity would encourage 
physicians to lend their services during public health emergencies while 
still holding them accountable for serious medical mistakes.160 
In the absence of an applicable immunity provision, however, it falls to 
the judicial system to determine whether a physician should be subject to 
civil liability for injuries sustained during a public health emergency.  In 
such a situation, courts and lawyers must recognize the tension between 
common law precedent and the need to provide a just and fair decision giv-
en the unique situation of a public health emergency.  The next Part argues 
that defendant physicians need not be constrained by traditional tort doc-
trines.  Within the common law there is precedent allowing judges acting as 
gatekeepers to take into account the circumstances surrounding a public 
health emergency. 
III. TORT LAW AND PRIVATE PHYSICIAN LIABILITY DURING PUBLIC 
HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
Courts often provide liability protection for actors serving the public 
interest.  In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized 
the need to balance the public interest advanced by public officials against 
individual plaintiffs’ need for compensation.161  The Court expressed con-
cern that subjecting government officials to litigation would distract them 
from their duties and inhibit their discretionary actions, ultimately deterring 
qualified people from public service.162 
Courts have also recognized that exposure to civil liability and punitive 
damages may discourage participation in government disaster relief.  In 
Doe v. American National Red Cross, a federal district court held that puni-
tive damages were not available to a plaintiff who brought an action against 
the Red Cross after contracting HIV through a blood transfusion.163  The 
court accorded great weight to the “governmental” services provided by the 
 
157  Id. at 1959–61. 
158  Id. at 1963. 
159  See id. 
160  Id. at 1967. 
161  457 U.S. 800, 814–16 (1982). 
162  Id. at 816. 
163  847 F. Supp. 643, 645 (W.D. Wis. 1994). 
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Red Cross, such as “furnishing volunteer aid to the armed forces in war-
time, acting as a medium of communication between the people of the 
United States and the armed forces, and carrying on a system of national 
and international relief.”164  Although the Red Cross presented no substan-
tial evidence that the threat of punitive damages would affect its services, 
the court did not want to risk deterring the Red Cross from providing public 
services in the future.165 
These cases address the liability of parties acting as arms of the gov-
ernment.  A physician responding to a public health emergency, however, 
works in a private capacity unless officially deputized by the state or federal 
government.  The following sections examine traditional tort doctrines that 
frequently arise in medical malpractice cases.  I argue that judges and law-
yers should adapt these doctrines to the unique circumstances of public 
health emergencies to provide physicians with greater protection from civil 
liability. 
A. Applicable Standards of Care 
To establish a prima facie case for medical malpractice, a plaintiff 
must show (1) a duty stemming from a doctor–patient relationship, (2) a 
standard of care to which the defendant is required to conform, (3) a breach 
of that standard by the defendant, and (4) a causal connection between the 
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.166  The applicable standard of 
care is perhaps the most debated issue in medical malpractice cases.  The 
formulation of the standard of care is a question of law for the court.167  
Once the court has formulated the standard, the application of the standard 
to the facts of the case is for the jury, absent summary judgment.168 
Until the 1970s, most jurisdictions applied the “locality rule,” which 
holds physicians to the standard of care of their local community.169  The lo-
 
164  Id. at 648–49. 
165  Id. at 649 (“There is a significant risk that subjecting defendant to damages large enough to pu-
nish or deter it would interfere gravely with defendant’s performance of the governmental functions for 
which it was chartered. . . .  ‘[T]he impact of [a punitive damage award] is likely to be both unpredicta-
ble and at times, substantial, and we are sensitive to the possible strain on local treasuries and therefore 
on services available to the public at large.’  Punitive damages awards have the possibility of placing a 
similar strain on defendant’s financial resources and on its ability to carry out the services it performs on 
behalf of the government in wartime and in disaster relief.” (citation omitted) (quoting Newport v. Fact 
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271–72 (1981)). 
166  Theresa K. Porter, Cause of Action Against Physician or Surgeon for Breach of the Duty of At-
tention and Care, in 21 CAUSES OF ACTION 1 (1990). 
167  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328B(c) (1965). 
168  Id. cmt. d (explaining that questions of fact are “within the recognized province of the jury as 
triers of fact” but that “over such questions of fact the courts always have reserved a preliminary power 
of decision, as to whether there is sufficient doubt about the issue to justify its submission to the jury”). 
169  See Michelle Huckaby Lewis, John K. Gohagan & Daniel J. Merenstein, Commentary, The Lo-
cality Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local Medical Practices vs the National Standard of Care, 
297 JAMA 2633, 2634 (2007).  Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted a national 
105:1347  (2011) First Line of Defense 
 1371
cality rule is both a rule of substantive law and a rule of evidence.170  As a 
rule of substantive law, it requires physicians to possess and exercise the 
degree of skill and care ordinarily employed in similar circumstances by 
physicians in good standing in their respective communities.171  The rule 
historically operated “to protect rural and small town physicians,”172 who 
were assumed to have restricted access to information and resources be-
cause of limited communication, distance, and financial constraints.173 
When operating as a rule of evidence, the locality rule limits which 
physicians can be certified to testify as expert witnesses during a jury trial.  
Due to the esoteric nature of medical practice, testimony by an expert wit-
ness is crucial to determining whether a defendant met the applicable stan-
dard of care.174  Under the strictest early form of the locality rule, only a 
physician who practiced in the same community could serve as an expert 
witness to establish the standard of care of that community.175  Courts later 
expanded the rule to hold physicians to the same standard as those in the 
“same or similar locality.”176  Moreover, some judges admitted expert testi-
mony by physicians who demonstrated familiarity with local standards even 
if they did not practice locally.177 
The locality rule fell into disfavor among the majority of jurisdictions 
in the 1970s.178  The nationalization of medical education and the ability to 
communicate cheaply and efficiently supported a move towards standardiz-
ing the medical profession.179  Most courts currently use a national standard 
whereby a physician is under a duty to use that degree of care and skill that 
is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same specialty act-
 
standard, while twenty-one states maintain some version of the locality rule.  Eleanor D. Kinney et al., 
Altered Standards of Care for Health Care Providers in the Pandemic Influenza, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 
1, 5 (2009). 
170  See 33 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 6 (1983 & Supp. 2010). 
171  See Kinney et al., supra note 169, at 4; Lewis, Gohagan & Merenstein, supra note 169, at 2634. 
172  See Kinney et al., supra note 169, at 4. 
173  John C. Drapp III, The National Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Actions: Does Small 
Area Analysis Make It Another Legal Fiction?, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 95, 101 (2003); Kinney et 
al., supra note 169, at 4. 
174  Mather v. Griffin Hosp., 540 A.2d 666, 670 (Conn. 1988) (“In a medical malpractice action, ex-
pert testimony is required to establish the standard of professional care to which the defendant is 
held . . . .”); Drapp, supra note 173, at 98–99; Lewis, Gohagan & Merenstein, supra note 169, at 2633 
(“97% of medical malpractice cases involve expert medical testimony, with an average of 5 witnesses 
per trial.”). 
175  Lewis, Gohagan & Merenstein, supra note 169, at 2634. 
176  Id. 
177  See, e.g., Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172, 178 (Conn. 1976) (“[T]he ‘crucial question’ is not 
whether the witness has practiced in the neighborhood but ‘whether he knows what those standards 
are.’” (quoting Ardoline v. Keegan, 102 A.2d 352, 355 (Conn. 1954))). 
178  Lewis, Gohagan & Merenstein, supra note 169, at 2634. 
179  Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 870–71 (Miss. 1985) (asserting the reasons for moving to a na-
tional standard of care); Drapp, supra note 173, at 101. 
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ing in the same or similar circumstances.180  Thus, the local practice of the 
physician’s community is no longer a crucial factor in determining the ap-
plicable standard of care.181 
In a public health emergency, however, there are strong justifications 
for retaining the locality rule or, at the very least, using the locality rule to 
provide a foundation for courts to take into account the unique circums-
tances of an area affected by a public health emergency.  I propose that, 
during a public health emergency, a physician should not be held to the na-
tional standard of care that governs in ordinary malpractice cases.  Instead, 
the standard should be determined by the practices of physicians and public 
health care workers from the same or a similar community affected by the 
public health emergency. 
A national standard of care should not be applied during a public 
health emergency because physicians in the affected community face signif-
icantly different opportunities, experiences, and conditions of practice de-
pending on how the community responds to the public health emergency.182  
Although the nationalized standard of care purports to be flexible by taking 
into account the circumstances under which a physician practices,183 public 
health emergencies are so rare that few physicians have the experience to 
testify about what should be done in those exceptional circumstances.184  
The medical literature demonstrates a dearth of guidance about the appro-
priate public health emergency standard of care, resulting in great uncer-
tainty among physicians.185  During Hurricane Katrina, for example, 
physicians struggled to identify the appropriate standard of care.186  As a re-
 
180  Lewis, Gohagan & Merenstein, supra note 169, at 2633–34. 
181  Id. at 2634. 
182  See James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Risk Management in the Wake of Hurricanes and Other Disas-
ters: Hospital Civil Liability Arising from the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Emergen-
cies, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 57, 62 (2006); Surge Capacity Conference, supra note 147. 
183  See, e.g., George J. Annas, Author’s Response to Letter to the Editor, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1380, 1380 (2010) (arguing that “the current standard of care already covers disasters by explicitly re-
cognizing that circumstances and resources constrain what physicians can do”). 
184  Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Letter to the Editor, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1378, 1378–79 (2010) 
(critiquing the lack of guidance for physicians on crisis standards of care). 
185  See id. at 1379 (“A usable framework regarding crisis standards of care that are based on expert 
consensus building helps ensure the equitable and fair distribution of limited health care resources, the-
reby reducing morbidity and mortality in emergencies.”); see also HEALTH SYS. RESEARCH, INC., 
ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE IN MASS CASUALTY EVENTS 1 (2005) (explaining that one purpose of 
the report is to identify the tools and guidance necessary to ensure “effective health and medical care 
response[s]” to mass casualty events, which can compromise the ability of local and regional health sys-
tems to deliver services consistent with established standards of care). 
186  Gostin et al., supra note 184, at 1378–79; see also Ofer Merin et al., Perspective, The Israeli 
Field Hospital in Haiti—Ethical Dilemmas in Early Disaster Response, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. E38(1), 
E38(1) (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1001693 (describing the extreme 
circumstances under which physicians practiced in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti and the tri-
age decisions they were forced to make). 
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sult, establishing a nationally recognized standard of care in a public health 
emergency becomes extremely difficult if a testifying physician has no ex-
perience or training under the applicable circumstances, and the medical li-
terature itself does not provide any clear standards. 
As such, a standard of care based on the locality rule provides a more 
just way of determining whether a physician acted negligently under the 
circumstances.  For example, during a public health emergency, a physician 
may need to defer taking care of patients with urgent medical needs.187  The 
increased wait time may have a significant negative effect on a patient’s 
condition resulting in injury.188  In a jurisdiction applying a national stan-
dard of care, a plaintiff can present expert testimony from a physician who 
practices in an area remote from the disaster and who purports to account 
for all the circumstances under which the defendant physician was practic-
ing.  This testimony, however, does not provide the trier of fact with rele-
vant information.  Without having been involved in a similar emergency 
situation herself or having demonstrated knowledge of local emergency re-
sponse plans, the expert cannot provide insight into the reasonableness of 
the defendant’s actions.189  Thus, experts should be required to testify about 
the local emergency response policies and the practices of local physicians 
responding to the crisis to provide evidence of the applicable standard of 
care.  Courts must consider that the decision to defer patient care may not 
be negligence but a local decision of how to allocate strained community 
resources during a public emergency.190 
Taking into account local characteristics in determining the applicable 
standard of care is consistent with recent trends in the provision of public 
health services.  Public health experts promote increased “regionalization” 
of public health services to better meet the needs of local communities dur-
ing health crises.191  A region is comprised of communities likely to be simi-
 
187  See Ciottone, supra note 9, at 5; see also Kipnis, supra note 136, at 61 (“It is easy to accede to 
the everyday moral imperative to accord the greatest attention to the worst-off victims, but this compas-
sionate response cascades into major problems later on.  On any ordinary day, clinicians would do what-
ever it took to save this patient’s life.  Today she must be black-tagged as ‘expectant’ and left to die, 
even as those with lesser wounds are treated.”). 
188  See George P. Smith, II, Re-shaping the Common Good in Times of Public Health Emergencies: 
Validating Medical Triage, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 9–13 (2009) (criticizing the modern triage system 
and how individuals who are “in the best shape” are forced to wait for treatment). 
189  See James G. Hodge Jr. & Brooke Courtney, Commentary, Assessing the Legal Standard of 
Care in Public Health Emergencies, 303 JAMA 361, 362 (2010) (highlighting the difficulty in defining 
what a reasonable practitioner would do in an emergency, even within the same locality, given that the 
scarcity of resources may make optimal care impossible). 
190  See id. (arguing that malpractice claims should be examined based on how consistent a practi-
tioner acts with the need to maximize a community’s health outcome). 
191  See Howard K. Koh et al., Regionalization of Local Public Health Systems in the Era of Prepa-
redness, 29 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 205, 206 (2008) (referring to “regionalization” as “the addition of 
a regional structure to supplement local government agencies, which in some instances might lead to 
consolidation of services or agencies”). 
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larly affected by a public health crisis.  Emergency response plans are then 
tailored to fit the specific needs of a region.  When designing a regional 
plan for the provision of public health services, authorities consider factors 
such as local geography, demographics, citizen mobility, and the local me-
dia market.192  Because characteristics of a local community play an impor-
tant part in government emergency response plans, these factors should also 
be taken into account on the private side of emergency response through the 
applicable standard of care. 
A defendant physician may need to overcome court precedents that do 
not recognize an altered standard of care in other unique practice environ-
ments.  In particular, some courts have refused to apply an altered standard 
of care for medical treatment administered in prisons.  In Moss v. Miller, an 
inmate filed a medical malpractice action against an optometrist for failing 
to refer him to an ophthalmologist, which allegedly resulted in a serious eye 
injury.193  At trial, the defense attacked the credibility of the plaintiff’s ex-
pert witness, who testified about the national standard of care, by pointing 
out that the expert had never practiced in a prison and thus could not know 
the applicable standard of care.194  The appeals court held that the jury could 
not “draw a distinction between medical decisions made in a prison setting 
and those made in the community just outside its walls.”195 
The appeals court, however, did not foreclose the possibility of an al-
tered standard of care in limited situations.  Although it rejected the applica-
tion of the locality rule to medical treatment in prisons, it went on to state 
that physicians should not be held liable for injuries resulting from institu-
tional constraints that cause delay or limit resources.196  Following this rea-
soning, courts determining the applicable standard of care should consider a 
physician’s limited resources and the constraints of the practice environ-
ment.  A physician working during a public health emergency faces chal-
lenges similar to those that justify the use of the locality rule in remote 
communities, namely a lack of both expertise and health care resources.197  
Applying localized considerations in determining the standard of care ac-
knowledges that a physician must adapt her practice to the idiosyncratic 
needs of and resources available in the affected community.  In addition, it 
 
192  See, e.g., Michael A. Stoto & Lindsey Morse, Regionalization in Local Public Health Systems: 
Public Health Preparedness in the Washington Metropolitan Area, 123 PUB. HEALTH REP. 461, 462 
(2008) (detailing factors considered in developing a regional public health plan for the Washington, 
D.C. area). 
193  625 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
194  Id. at 1051–52. The defense argued that jurors should consider the locality rule in assessing the 
applicable standard of care, in this case by distinguishing between medical treatment in prison and med-
ical treatment outside prison.  Id. at 1051. 
195  Id. at 1051. 
196  Id.  For example, the court explained that if a doctor makes a referral but there is a delay due to 
prison regulations, the doctor should not be held liable for injuries resulting from those constraints.  Id. 
197  See supra notes 169–77 and accompanying text. 
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recognizes that only physicians who have experience working within that 
affected community or a similarly affected community can offer evidence to 
properly define the appropriate standard of care in that emergency situation. 
Moreover, public health emergencies can be distinguished from prison 
situations because the access to resources in the former is not artificially li-
mited.  A prison doctor may have opportunities outside of the institutional 
constraints of a prison to ensure adequate care.  For example, the optometr-
ist in Moss could have gone to the department responsible for referral re-
quests to expedite the referral.198  In contrast, during a public health 
emergency, a physician faces the very real constraints of locally available 
resources and personal stamina. 
In summary, courts should alter the applicable standard of care during 
public health emergencies.  The standard should be defined by the practices 
of the local community or a similar community when affected by a public 
health emergency.  Utilizing this rule would allow courts to account for the 
unique circumstances of medical practice during a public health emergency 
and to recognize the lack of a comprehensive national standard.  Adopting 
the locality rule in these situations also would facilitate the principle that 
physicians should not be liable for injuries that result from constraints on 
human and medical resources.  Judges formulating the standard of care 
should consider that a shortage of trained personnel, limited hospital re-
sources, and pressures from local health authorities in the midst of a patient 
surge may require physicians to make extraordinarily difficult but necessary 
medical decisions for the good of the community—decisions that ordinarily 
might be the basis for a malpractice claim.199 
B. Good Samaritan Laws 
An affirmative defense to liability that physicians can invoke is Good 
Samaritan immunity.  In 1959, California enacted the first state statute pro-
viding physicians with Good Samaritan immunity from civil liability result-
ing from emergency care.200  This statute provided that “[n]o person 
licensed under this chapter, who in good faith renders emergency care at the 
scene of an emergency, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of 
any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.”201  
 
198  See Moss, 625 N.E.2d at 1048–49. 
199  See Hodge & Courtney, supra note 189, at 362 (“Decisions to restrict, limit, or deny care to spe-
cific patients may be warranted by communal needs arising from [an] emergency . . . .”). 
200  Stewart R. Reuter, Physicians as Good Samaritans: Should They Receive Immunity for Their 
Negligence When Responding to Hospital Emergencies?, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 157 (1999); see also 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2395 (West 2003) (providing the current language of the statute). 
201  Colby v. Schwartz, 144 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 2144 (1976)). 
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Since 1959, all states have adopted varying degrees of immunity for physi-
cians who act in a Good Samaritan capacity in providing emergency care.202 
Good Samaritan immunity allows physicians to provide prompt care in 
the case of an accident without fear of malpractice suits.203  These statutes 
typically relieve a person from liability if she renders emergency care in 
good faith.204  A judge can decide that Good Samaritan immunity applies as 
a matter of law upon summary judgment unless the plaintiff establishes that 
there is room for reasonable disagreement about the facts or about whether 
the defendant met the standard of conduct required by the law.205  A judge 
applying and interpreting Good Samaritan immunity thus acts as a gate-
keeper by determining which malpractice cases proceed to the jury. 
Good Samaritan immunity typically applies only when a physician 
renders aid without a preexisting duty to do so—for example, if a physician 
comes upon a patient by chance or on an irregular basis.206  In contrast, a 
physician who visits a patient in a hospital already owes a duty to the pa-
tient and therefore needs no additional inducement to offer aid.207  Thus, 
physicians rendering emergency care in hospitals are usually barred from 
invoking this immunity.   
To determine whether there is a preexisting duty, a judge will often 
look for an employment contract or an established physician–patient rela-
tionship.208  However, even contractual employment with a hospital or phy-
sician group may not be determinative of whether the physician has a 
preexisting duty of care.  A physician working in a hospital who does not 
ordinarily respond to emergency situations, such as a family practitioner, 
may be able to assert the defense.  For example, in McKenna v. Cedars of 
Lebanon Hospital, the defendant physician showed that he was not on call 
for emergencies, did not typically respond to emergencies, and did not have 
a preexisting relationship with the plaintiff.209  The judge held that under the 
circumstances the doctor was a volunteer even though he was employed by 
the hospital and that he therefore qualified for the Good Samaritan de-
 
202  Reuter, supra note 200, at 157. 
203  See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 282 (2002). 
204  See, e.g., Clayton v. Kelly, 357 S.E.2d 865, 867–68 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Gomes v. Hameed, 
184 P.3d 479, 484 (Okla. 2008); McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Tex. 2003). 
205  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 328B–328C (1965) (discussing the functions of the 
judge and jury in a negligence action). 
206  See Reuter, supra note 200, at 167. 
207  See Colby v. Schwartz, 144 Cal. Rptr. 624, 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
208  See, e.g., Gomes, 184 P.3d at 484 (indicating that the Oklahoma court would evaluate prior con-
tractual relationships between the injured person and his rescuer); McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 744 (naming 
whether the rescuer regularly administers care in a hospital emergency room setting as a factor for de-
termining whether the Good Samaritan statute applies).  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 328B(b) (stating that whether the defendant owes a legal duty is a question of law for the 
court). 
209  155 Cal. Rptr. 631, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
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fense.210  Following McKenna’s reasoning, a physician employed by a hos-
pital does not have a preexisting duty to all patients in the hospital and may 
be covered by Good Samaritan immunity when providing aid during a hos-
pital emergency. 
In circumstances more akin to a public health crisis, some courts are 
willing to extend Good Samaritan immunity to physicians responding to 
community emergencies.211  Willingham v. Hudson considered a situation in 
which a tornado struck a Georgia town and inundated local hospitals with 
severely injured victims.212  Local physicians were requested to assist in 
treating the influx of patients.213  The defendant was a local family practi-
tioner who responded to the request.214  He treated and sutured a tornado 
victim’s lacerated leg.215  Several days later, the patient’s leg became in-
fected, and it ultimately had to be amputated.216 
The Georgia appellate court upheld summary judgment for the defen-
dant, finding that Good Samaritan immunity applied.217  The statutory re-
quirement that care be administered at the “scene of an emergency” was 
satisfied because the hospital faced a surge of patients resulting from a natu-
ral disaster.218  Although the patient’s leg laceration was not critical, the 
court found that the defendant’s treatment constituted emergency care be-
cause it was administered during “an unforeseen circumstance that called 
for immediate action.”219  Most significant, the court determined that the de-
fendant did not have a preexisting duty to the plaintiff even though he had 
an employment contract with the hospital because he had not been required 
to report for duty on the night of the tornado.220 
Whether a physician has a preexisting duty to treat a patient can turn 
on what the court considers to be the “normal course of practice” for a par-
ticular physician defendant.  This standard was first implemented in Colby 
v. Schwartz, a case that provided significant insight into the policy consid-
erations behind Good Samaritan immunity.221  Walter Colby sustained se-
rious injuries from a car accident.222  He was rushed to the local emergency 
room where a physician began treating him and then transferred him to an 
 
210  Id. 
211  Willingham v. Hudson, 617 S.E.2d 192, 197–98 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
212  Id. at 193. 
213  Id.  
214  Id.  Defendant Mark Hudson was neither an on-call physician nor an emergency room backup 
physician on the date of the incident.  Id. 
215  Id. at 193–94. 
216  Id. at 194. 
217  Id. at 195. 
218  Id. 
219  Id. at 195–97. 
220  Id. at 197. 
221  See Colby v. Schwartz, 144 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627–29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
222  Id. at 625–26. 
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intensive care unit.223  In the intensive care unit, another physician examined 
the patient and ordered an exploratory surgical procedure.224  While in sur-
gery, Colby died from lacerations to multiple organs caused by the blunt 
force of the car accident.225 
Colby’s widow and children sued the physicians and surgeons who at-
tended to him on the day of his accident, challenging the timeliness of the 
diagnosis and the remedial steps taken.226  The defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment under California’s Good Samaritan statute, claiming they 
had provided “emergency medical care” and that “their care conformed to 
the standard exercised by prudent physicians acting under the same or simi-
lar circumstances.”227  The court rejected the defendants’ request and rea-
soned that the Good Samaritan statute only covered physician aid when the 
“the expertise of the physician and facilities could be severely limited” and 
acknowledged that “the general practitioner might well find himself treating 
an individual for needs outside his training.”228 
The circumstances under which Good Samaritan statutes protect physi-
cian aid might well apply to a public health emergency.  During such an 
emergency, the shortage of trained personnel will likely prompt hospitals to 
request assistance from physicians with all types of specialty training, many 
of whom are not trained in emergency medicine.229  Thus, physicians work-
ing outside the ordinary scope of their duties in the face of a public health 
crisis will likely be eligible for this immunity. 
The language in Colby also provides insight into how Good Samaritan 
immunity can extend to a physician trained in emergency medicine.  The 
court indicated that the scope of Good Samaritan protection depends on a 
defendant’s skills and training and whether the circumstances placed un-
usual demands on those skills.230  During a public health emergency, the 
surge of patients may alter the availability of medical resources and person-
nel so drastically that the hospital environment differs significantly from the 
 
223  Id. at 626. 
224  Id. 
225  Id. 
226  Id. at 625. 
227  Id. at 625–26 (quoting defendants’ declarations) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
228  Id. at 628. 
229  Hodge et al., supra note 182, at 63 (“To meet surge capacity, hospitals may draw upon their ex-
isting workforce, temporarily hired personnel, or [volunteer health professionals].”); see also Sayeedha 
Ghori Uddin et al., Emergency Preparedness: Addressing a Residency Training Gap, 83 ACAD. MED. 
298, 298–99 (2008) (noting that after Hurricane Katrina, physicians of all specialties, including internal 
medicine, neurosurgery, and ophthalmology, faced the reality of providing care after the disaster). 
230  See Colby, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 628 (“[D]efendants in performing the exploratory surgical proce-
dure were practicing within their area of expertise and with all of the benefits of full hospital facilities.  
It is therefore not unreasonable to hold them to the level of skill and training required under such cir-
cumstances.  Further, there is no indication in the record that the exigencies of decedent’s condition 
placed any unusual or unforeseen demands on defendants’ skills.”). 
105:1347  (2011) First Line of Defense 
 1379
situation to which emergency physicians are accustomed.231  For instance, 
rapidly transforming an emergency room into a clinic or mass immuniza-
tion center falls outside the normal scope of emergency physicians’ du-
ties.232 
In addition, an emergency physician likely must shift focus from a pa-
tient-oriented perspective to a public-needs perspective.233  Recent studies 
on the education of medical residents have found, however, that emergency 
physicians are not specially trained to address mass public health needs.234  
Moreover, the medical field recognizes disaster medicine as a distinct spe-
cialty requiring multidisciplinary study.235  Thus, a physician’s limited train-
ing in disaster medicine and the broader public health arena could be used 
to argue that she should be eligible for Good Samaritan immunity in a pub-
lic health crisis. 
In sum, although Good Samaritan immunity does not typically cover 
physicians confronting emergencies in hospitals, some courts have opened 
the door for the expansion of immunity protection to physicians responding 
to public health emergencies. 
 
231  See, e.g., Hodge et al., supra note 182, at 62 (“The incorporation of new professionals into the 
operational structure of a hospital requires careful planning, adept management, and rigorous oversight, 
particularly during an emergency when circumstances may be stressful, novel, and chaotic.”); Williams, 
supra note 121, at 105–12 (explaining how hospital revenues and reserves could be quickly depleted 
during emergency responses). 
232  The medical literature recognizes that there is no standardized approach to managing a mass 
clinic; rather, doing so relies on the intuitions of health workers and the practical realities of available 
resources.  See Paul Campbell Erwin, Lorinda Sheeler & John M. Lott, A Shot in the Rear, Not a Shot in 
the Dark: Application of a Mass Clinic Framework in a Public Health Emergency, 124 PUB. HEALTH 
REP. 212, 213 (2009). 
233  See supra notes 149–54 and accompanying text.  In normal emergency triage, the physician al-
ready considers more than the needs of the individual patient, but in a public health emergency, she ad-
ditionally must consider not only those in her emergency room but also the public at large and the needs 
of the government emergency response plans.  See Ciottone, supra note 9, at 5; Hodge & Courtney, su-
pra note 189, at 362 (noting that communal needs may take precedence over individual patients’ needs 
during a public health emergency); see also Hogan & Burstein, supra note 20, at 3 (“The provision of 
health care after a disaster is dependent on multiple areas of medical expertise, such as public health, 
primary care, surgery, infectious diseases, toxicology, and many others.”). 
234  Uddin et al., supra note 229, at 299.  Although there is widespread recognition in the medical 
field that physician involvement and leadership are important in emergency preparedness, the literature 
also suggests that residencies of various specialties, including surgery and emergency medicine, are not 
addressing the training needs adequately.  For example, only 49% of resident physicians have trained for 
terrorism-related conditions; thus, residents are not receiving enough training for decisionmaking in re-
source-poor settings.  Id.; see also Steve Kefalas & Anna S. Shalkham, Resident Education and Training 
in Disaster Medicine, DISASTER MED. SEC. (Am. Coll. Emergency Physicians) (Jan. 2006), 
http://www.acep.org/ACEPmembership.aspx?id=40128 (explaining that the Residency Review Commit-
tee does not require disaster response training as part of the emergency medicine residency curriculum). 
235  See Ciottone, supra note 9, at 5 (“The field of disaster medicine involves the study of subject 
matter from multiple medical disciplines.”). 
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IV. FEDERAL AND STATE COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY PUBLIC HEALTH 
POLICY TO FACILITATE LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR EMERGENCY 
RESPONDERS 
Part III has presented state tort doctrines that can be applied to protect 
physicians from civil liability during public health emergencies.  Applying 
these common law protections during public health emergencies is especial-
ly important in the absence of comprehensive immunity statutes, such as the 
one proposed by Professor Hoffman.236  Even if federal laws protect private 
physicians from liability, state court decisions will continue to affect physi-
cian liability unless federal law expressly preempts state common law or 
state legislatures pass corresponding immunity provisions.  In addition, 
states may depend on federal laws that create alternative forms of plaintiff 
compensation so that they can pass state legislation providing for physician 
immunity during public health emergencies.  Thus, in order to provide lia-
bility protection for private physicians and other emergency responders, 
state and federal governments must coordinate their emergency health care 
policies.  This Part briefly explores issues of preemption and victim com-
pensation that often arise in discussions of liability protection at the state 
and federal levels. 
A. Federal Preemption 
Private physicians responding to public health emergencies should be 
concerned about preemption.  Federal protection of potential codefendants 
(such as drug manufacturers) may force plaintiffs to seek redress primarily 
from physicians.237  Moreover, even if federal laws offer some liability pro-
tection for private physicians, courts may not always interpret the federal 
law as preempting state common law.  Although preemption deserves a 
separate study unto itself, this Part briefly explores preemption issues that 
may arise in the context of a public health emergency and their impact on 
the liability of public health emergency responders. 
There is little case law addressing the extent to which federal emergen-
cy statutes preempt state common law.  Under courts’ interpretations of the 
Supremacy Clause,238 federal law preempts state law in three situations: 
(1) when Congress has clearly expressed its intent to preempt state law (ex-
press preemption), (2) when Congress has shown its intent to occupy an en-
tire field of regulation by legislating comprehensively (field preemption),239 
 
236  See supra Part II.C. 
237  See Gregory D. Curfman, Stephen Morrissey & Jeffrey M. Drazen, Perspective, Why Doctors 
Should Worry About Preemption, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2–3 (2008). 
238  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (making laws enacted by Congress “the supreme Law of the Land”); 
Coll. Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 595 (4th Cir. 2005). 
239  The intent to occupy a regulatory field 
may be inferred from a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” or where an Act of Congress 
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and (3) when state law conflicts with federal law (conflict preemption).240  
Based on the language of federal emergency statutes and recent Supreme 
Court cases addressing preemption in the context of medical products, we 
can speculate as to whether federal emergency laws will preempt causes of 
action under state law.  Two possibilities emerge.  First, courts may limit 
federal preemption of state emergency laws to the medical product context.  
Second, courts may interpret the broad language used in new federal emer-
gency statutes and the underlying concerns of national security as attempts 
by Congress to occupy the field of public health emergency response. 
Federal public health emergency provisions expressly preempting state 
law usually concern medical product use.  The development of vaccine 
compensation funds over the last forty years demonstrates the federal gov-
ernment’s trend toward absorbing the costs of liability for injuries arising 
from emergency response measures.241  After the September 11, 2001 at-
tacks, the federal government expanded immunity provisions, preempting 
much of state tort law pertaining to civil immunity.242 
The most sweeping of these recent acts is PREPA.243  During the effec-
tive period, PREPA expressly preempts the enforcement of state laws or le-
gal requirements that relate to the provision of emergency countermeasures 
(design, development, clinical testing or investigation, manufacture, labe-
ling, distribution, formulation, packaging, marketing, promotion, sale, pur-
chase, donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, licensing, or use) 
and differ from PREPA obligations.244  The statute empowers the HHS Sec-
retary to provide civil immunity to manufacturers of countermeasures and 
any entity along the chain of distribution.245  It covers not only stockpiled 
countermeasures, such as vaccines, but also any product that might be used 
to respond to a public health emergency.246  Thus, any tort claim involving a 
medical product used as a countermeasure should be expressly preempted 
by federal statute. 
 
“touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be as-
sumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” 
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Ele-
vator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
240  English, 496 U.S. at 78–79; Coll. Loan, 396 F.3d at 595–96. 
241  See supra Part I.C.2. 
242  See George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-tort World?, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 
175, 177–80 (2007).  For example, under the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, 
the federal government absorbs liability for claims arising out of the production and distribution of 
smallpox vaccines during a smallpox emergency.  Id. at 217–21. 
243  42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d to -6e (2006). 
244  42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1)–(2). 
245  Id. § 247d-6d(a)–(b). 
246  See id. § 247d-6d(a)(5). 
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Recent Supreme Court cases involving medical products under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),247 however, create uncer-
tainty about whether federal statutes like PREPA preempt state common 
law.  In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court addressed the issue of whether 
certain New York tort laws constituted “requirements” that were specifical-
ly preempted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA).248  The 
Court concluded that both FDA premarket approvals of medical devices 
and state common law actions for negligence and strict liability imposed re-
quirements under the statute.249  It therefore held that states could not en-
force disparate common law requirements against medical device 
manufacturers after they received FDA premarket approval.250 
In Wyeth v. Levine,251 however, the Supreme Court came to a different 
conclusion about preemption regarding prescription drugs.  The Supreme 
Court held that FDA approval of a label did not preempt state law failure-
to-warn claims.252  The Court distinguished Wyeth from Riegel because 
Congress had declined to extend the MDA express preemption provision to 
prescription drugs.253 
The application of these precedents to emergency laws is uncertain be-
cause emergency countermeasures employ both medical devices and pre-
scription drugs.  The Project BioShield Act, for instance, amended the 
FDCA to authorize the HHS Secretary to approve both medical devices and 
prescription drugs for emergency use.254  It is unclear how Wyeth and Riegel 
would apply to these emergency authorizations. 
Federal emergency laws such as PREPA and the Project BioShield 
Act, however, differ from other public health laws because they emphasize 
national security.255  The federal government traditionally governs in the 
 
247  21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399a (2006). 
248  552 U.S. 312, 321–22 (2008).  The MDA organizes federal safety oversight for medical devices, 
and the preemption provision of the statute provides that a state shall not 
establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement—
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [federal law] to the 
device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter in-
cluded in a requirement applicable to the device under [relevant federal law].   
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
249  Reigel, 552 U.S. at 322–24. 
250  Id. at 325, 330. 
251  129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
252  Id. at 1203–04. 
253  See id. at 1196. 
254  See Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, sec. 4, § 564(a)(1), 118 Stat. 835, 853 
(amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2006)). 
255  See id. (describing the Project BioShield Act as an Act “[t]o amend the Public Health Service 
Act to provide protections and countermeasures against chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents that 
may be used in a terrorist attack against the United States”); Copper, supra note 6, at 66 (providing that 
PREPA passed under the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address 
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areas of foreign policy and national security.256  Although public health ad-
ministration is traditionally viewed as a state or local issue,257 the September 
11, 2001 attacks and subsequent anthrax incidents made clear that bioterror-
ism poses a legitimate threat to national security.258  In conjunction with 
preventing bioterrorist attacks, Congress expressly recognized national epi-
demics as a possible threat to national security.259  Hence, federal laws ad-
dressing public health emergencies do not distinguish between natural 
emergencies and terrorist attacks.260  Viewing emergency laws as part of the 
federal prerogative of national security creates a stronger possibility that 
federal laws protecting emergency responders (such as private physicians 
and drug manufacturers) will preempt state tort laws and provide compre-
hensive protection from civil liability. 
B. Victim Compensation 
Preemption issues often arise when Congress creates federal compen-
sation funds for the collateral effects of emergency response policies.261  
These victim compensation funds are often meant to supplant traditional 
avenues of recovery and protect emergency responders from civil liabili-
ty.262  Federal compensation may also be necessary to garner political sup-
port for federal and state statutes providing civil immunity to certain par-
parties.  Some debate continues over whether these federal funds provide an 
adequate alternative to compensation through litigation. 
Nevertheless, in a public health emergency, especially in the face of an 
unforeseen biological agent like a pandemic flu, the federal government 
may be justified in compensating individuals injured by emergency re-
 
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 
2680 (2005), a national military appropriations bill). 
256  This is crucial because when addressing preemption courts look to the historical division of 
power between states and the federal government.  See, e.g., Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194–95. 
257  See, e.g., HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 14, at 11. 
258  See Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness: A Re-
turn to the Rule of Law, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 341, 352–54 (2009) (explaining that the attacks led govern-
ment officials to find bioterrorism threats very real and very threatening and describing officials’ 
proposed, and often misguided, courses of action for preparing for future bioterrorist attacks). 
259  Id. 
260  Id. at 353 (“Converting the well-known risk of epidemics into the equivalent of war on the 
American people enabled the federal government to exert a degree of control over individual patients 
that was unprecedented in the modern era, and to spend federal dollars to encourage states to do the 
same.”). 
261  For example President Bush’s declaration of a public health emergency required FEMA to com-
pensate state and local officials for the liability costs resulting from emergency measures.  See supra 
note 31. 
262  See supra notes 68–81 and accompanying text (discussing congressional responses to vaccine 
manufacturer liability). 
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sponse measures.263  There are several advantages to relying on a public 
fund for this purpose.  Establishing a public fund in the wake of a public 
health emergency creates a sense of solidarity against an unpredictable 
force and evinces a sense of “collective compassion” for those affected.264  
Moreover, injured individuals can avoid the costs and time of litigation.  
Claimants are assured compensation under a fund whereas litigants must 
gamble in court.265  The no-fault system also allows victims to recover 
without tarnishing the records or reputations of physicians and hospitals.266  
This is especially desirable because it recognizes the extraordinary circums-
tances under which health care workers must perform during public health 
emergencies.267 
Individuals, however, may be reluctant to seek compensation from a 
fund due to restrictions on the awards.  Funds are often administered on a 
set schedule and may cap some damages.268  Some survivors of the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attacks objected to regulations in the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund of 2001 that cap the decedent’s noneconomic damages 
at $250,000 plus $100,000 for his spouse and each of his dependents.269  
Some existing government compensation programs for public health poli-
cies allow claimants to recover actual and projected expenses, including lost 
wages, medical expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, even where re-
covery for pain and suffering is capped.270  Thus, an individual may pursue 
tort litigation instead of fund compensation if she believes a jury would 
award substantial noneconomic damages.271 
 
263  See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 72, at 54 (discussing the government’s rationale for creating the 
1976 Swine Flu program and justifying the government’s action). 
264  Marshall S. Shapo, Compensation for Victims of Terror: A Specialized Jurisprudence of Injury, 
30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245, 1259 (2002) (noting that the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 
2001 “provides a certain balm for us all, in our continuing horror at the events, our collective compas-
sion for the victims, and our increased sense of vulnerability”). 
265  See id. at 1254. 
266  See id. at 1253–54. 
267  Cf. id. at 1252–53 (pointing out that the potential defendants in post-September 11, 2001 litiga-
tion included airlines and private security providers who received immunity under the September 11th 
Victim Compensation Fund and explaining that “[s]uits against the carriers, in the view of some, would 
provide some corrective justice in favor of the victims and survivors” but that “the enactment of the 
compensation legislation obviously is aimed at fairness in the round—at a kind of distributive justice in 
a situation where the concept of justice is multifaceted”). 
268  See, e.g., id. at 1250–51; see also id. at 1256 (arguing that, under the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund, “need is defined, in true capitalist style, as related closely to income levels”). 
269  28 C.F.R. § 104.44 (2010); Milo Geyelin, Criticism of Sept. 11 Victims’ Fund Sparks Backlash, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2002, at B1 (relating that a widowed New York City police officer complained, “I 
feel your offer spits on my wife, my mother-in-law and my father in law”).  See generally 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40101 (2006) (providing the full fund legislation). 
270  See, e.g., Copper, supra note 6, at 73 (describing legislative limits on compensation under the 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986). 
271  See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: Expe-
riences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645, 646 (2008) (theorizing 
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Funds may represent more of a political statement than a well-thought-
out alternative to the tort system.  Professor Shapo notes in his discussion of 
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund that “the statutory refer-
ences to those eligible for compensation do not appear to be rigorously log-
ical.”272  Other emergency funds have similar unexplained gaps in coverage.  
PREPA, for example, has been criticized for its failure to allocate money to 
the Covered Countermeasure Process Fund;273 doing so requires additional 
congressional action.274  Some Republicans claim that PREPA would not 
have passed if funds had been allocated directly because it would have been 
too expensive,275 but the allocation scheme under PREPA leaves the fund 
vulnerable in the event of a budget crisis.276  Without proper funding there is 
nothing to offset the waiver of liability for manufacturers and public health 
officials under PREPA, thereby leaving injured individuals without re-
course for compensation.  So although a federal compensation fund can ef-
fectively balance individual compensation with physician immunity during 
a public health emergency, the design and funding of a compensation fund 
demands careful deliberation if it is to have any real meaning. 
CONCLUSION 
Giving private physicians immunity from tort suits during public health 
emergencies does not violate traditional expectations of physicians either 
legally or socially.  Existing tort law already provides a foundation for phy-
sician immunity in public health emergencies, and courts could extend these 
principles easily. Moreover, legislatures have already provided liability pro-
tection to other emergency responders, such as manufacturers, public health 
officials, and government contractors. 
In the case of a public health emergency, the first-line responders are 
those working in the private sector.  Thus, to deny liability protection for 
private physicians who put themselves at risk for the public’s benefit takes 








that parties may stall a decision to receive fund compensation before waiving the right to litigation in the 
hope of receiving a higher payout). 
272  Shapo, supra note 264, at 1257. 
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274  See id. 
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